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Abstract
The leakage of privacy is one of the key factors to restrict the development of
smart grid. Currently, researches of protecting privacy in smart grid mainly
focused on two aspects: 1) data aggregation based on the mathematical model
and algorithm and 2) user anonymous authentication. However, data aggrega-
tion is at cost of obtaining fine-grained electricity consumption information to
protect privacy. While, anonymous authentication cannot identify the malicious
user in previous researches. Hence, in this work, we propose a group blind signa-
ture scheme in smart grid to accomplish conditional anonymity. Furthermore,
the integrity of consumption data can be verified by homomorphic encryption
(HE) which can decrease the communication overhead between control center
and smart meter remarkably. From the security analysis and experiment simu-
lation, the results show that our scheme is safety and efficient.
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1. Introduction
Since the American Electric Power Research Institute proposed the concept
of “Intelligrid” in 2001, the exploration of next-generation power grid has at-
tached many people’s attention. In 2003, the American Department of Energy
published a development plan called “Grid2030”, which defined the “smart grid”5
as a full automated electric transmission network that can supervise and control
each node [1, 2] [3]. The two-way flow of information and power in the whole
transmission and distribution process from power plant to end-user can be en-
sured. Recently, since the concept of industry 4.0 is proposed, the operation
and management of the smart grid can be optimized by connected all kinds of10
equipment and facilities. While, some concerns have arisen about the security of
smart grid in the industrial 4.0, just as shown in Fig. 1, the two-way communica-
tion is easy to be eavesdropped by attacker especially at user side. Attackers can
obtain different users’ power consumption for analysing their lifestyles [4, 5, 6].
So an efficient and safe data transmission scheme is a way to solve the problem.15
Recently, researches are seem to focus on the electricity privacy data ag-
gregation scheme [7, 8] [9, 10] [11].The principle is that user sends encrypted
electric consumption data to relay nodes which will decrypt them and aggregate
data into a multi-dimensional data set. The dataset allows control center to get
the sum or average of electricity consumption data, but cannot acquire the par-20
ticular user’s electricity usage data no matter what kind of data aggregation
schemes, including one dimensional data aggregation schemes [12, 13, 14] and
multi-dimensional data aggregation schemes [15, 16, 17]. These schemes are
at cost of acquiring fine-grained electricity usage data, in exchange of privacy-
preservation. To realize the multi-granularity electric management, the implicit25
anonymous authentication protocol is proposed by Tassos [18, 19] which can
achieve fine-grained analysis and management to data. However, the terminal
devices are needed to exchange information with control center directly which
is unrealistic in practice. In addition, there is a limitation for control center
to handle up the reporting request from terminal devices. For building IoT30
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Figure 1: Framework of Smart Grid
collection infrastructure, Chen [20] proposed a web-based monitoring system to
monitor household gas consumption, which greatly improved the communica-
tion efficiency among nodes. Meanwhile, in the aspect of IoT’s identification
and recognization, Hsia proposed these methods [21, 22, 23], which not only
reduce the system computation time, but also yield real-time requirement and35
achieve the high rate of recognition.
Hence, a scheme can achieve privacy-preserving is proposed by us which is
based on group blind signature [24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. Moreover, our scheme has
a good scalability when facing large-scale consumers.
1.1. Related work40
According to the aim of smart grid, a more reliable, efficient and control-
lable power service should be provided to residential and business customers.
However, many security and privacy problems are present in smart grid, for ex-
ample maliciously tampering the electric consumption data, eavesdropping user
privacy data. So an efficient scheme that can be applied to resource-constrained45
environment and privacy-preserving in smart grid needs to be put forward. The
related works are summarized as follow:
So far, many researches have focused on developing the data aggregation
technology by calculating sum of dimensional data, or using homomorphic op-
erators to masking the original data. In [29], authors successfully extend aggre-50
gation concepts from sensor networks into smart grid and use Paillier cryptosys-
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tem to aggregate consumption data, but the scheme cannot verify the integrity
of data. In [16], a data aggregation scheme that can convert multi-dimensional
data for several residential areas into aggregated-data cube. However, CC can
only acquire the sum of electricity consumption with coarse-grained data, but55
cannot restore the original data of single user. In general, these protocols can
protect the privacy at cost of sacrificing to acquire fine-grained data.
Hence, an escrow mechanism [30] is proposed by Efthymious that can au-
thenticate anonymous meter’s readings. However, it has to assume that the
escrow is fully trusted. The protocol [18] proposed by Tassos Dimitriou et al. is60
based on [19] that the allows utility provider to anonymously authenticate SM .
In addition, by using anonymous tokens to reward for users in exchange of their
fine-grained consumption details. However, both them have the same problem
that users are fully anonymity. If some special case happened, the CC cannot
get the any information of the user. It’s a concern that the user maliciously65
tampers the consumption but CC cannot revoke its anonymity. Meanwhile,
the interaction between users and CC is point-to-point, so that the processing
capacity is limited in their experiment.
Furthermore, a privacy-preserving scheme [31] was proposed by T.jeske et
al. in smart grid based on the group signature. It can not only preserve user’s70
privacy, but also prevent spamming and replay attacks. However, the scheme
cannot revoke anonymity of users in case of need. While, double discrete log-
arithm knowledge signature and discrete logarithm e root knowledge signature
is adopted in the protocol [32] which make the whole system in low efficiency.
Note that all the above protocols have been analysed and proofed security,75
but there are different problems in these papers, such as: the granularity of
consumption data, anonymity revoking, processing capacity, data integrity and
so on. Motivated by these various weaknesses, an efficient and privacy-friendly
scheme in smart grid should have these following features:
1. The fine-grained consumption data can be analysed without revealing80
user’s identify.
2. Anonymity of user can be revoked if in need, such as the consumption
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data has been tampered by maliciously user.
3. It’s necessary to introduce the middle model. If the participator has been
involved in the point-to-point transmission, the delay is inevitable in the process85
of transmission and will cause great time waste.
4. Data integrity can be verified by CC.
To the best of our knowledge, it’s our greatest contribution that apply group
blind signature to smart grid. Firstly, based on the features of the group blind
signature, the signature and message reveal neither the identity of data owner90
nor identity of the issuing signer. Then, the scheme is a conditional group
blind signature which can identity malicious user if necessary [33].At last, we
introduce the homomorphic tag mechanism [34, 35, 36, 37, 38] to verify the
integrity of data. We believe that our contributions can widen the application
scope of privacy-preserving in smart grid.95
1.2. Organization
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, our contri-
butions are elaborated in detail. In Section 3, we precisely present preliminaries
and the system model. The system model and security requirements are pre-
sented in section 4. In Section 5, we show how our scheme perform from user100
anonymous authorization to data reporting, which can be achieved by using
blind signature and homomorphic verifiable tag mechanism. In Section 6, we
analyse the security of all stages in our scheme. In Section 7, we present the
performance analysis and evaluation. At last, in Section 8, we conclude the
paper and propose the future work, respectively.105
2. Main Contributions
In this paper, a privacy-preserving scheme in smart grid based on group
blind signature is proposed by us, which enables CC to trace the potential
corrupted SS and SM conditional. Moreover, an efficient anonymous authen-
tication scheme and data integrity verification mechanism are provided in our110
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paper, which can satisfy the need of efficiency and stability in power system.
The main contributions of this paper are concluded as follows:
1. Innovatively applying the structure of group blind signature
to smart grid. In this paper, to meet the requirements of privacy-preserving,
anonymity and traceability, we propose a scheme based on group blind signa-115
ture. Moreover, to fit resource-constrained and high-efficiency environment, the
process of generating blind signature and tracing the malicious users are also
improved in terms of efficiency.
2.Anonymous authentication and conditional anonymity can be
realized in our scheme. We present an efficient anonymous authentication120
scheme based on the schnorr identification protocol, which signer only knows
it’s a legal user without revealing real identity. Once the fault happened, the
scheme will perform fault detection to locate the fault. If data has tampered
by user, CC will conditionally revoke the anonymity of user, which makes the
system more stable.125
3. Privacy data can be transmitted securely without being tam-
pered with in our scheme. In the process of data transmission, the ho-
momorphic verification method in the cloud auditing [39, 40] is employed in
our scheme. According to the bilinearity properties of the bilinear pairing, CC
can make sure that data has been modified as long as the data block has been130
tampered with.
The contributions mentioned above are applied to the privacy protection in
our scheme. In addition, from our simulation results, it’s clear that our scheme
is efficient when facing large-scale users.
3. Preliminaries135
3.1. RSA algorithm
RSA [41] was proposed in the 1977 which is considered as first and widely
used asymmetric-key cryptosystem. The security and reliability of RSA algo-
rithm is depend n the hardness of integer factorization problem. The RSA
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algorithm consists of four phases: key generation, key distribution, encryption140
and decryption.
• Key generation: The system computes N = pq and Euler’s totient func-
tion ϕ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1), where p and q should be chosen randomly and
similar in magnitude but differ in length. Choosing an integer e satisfying
the condition that 1 < e < ϕ(N) and gcd(e, ϕ(N)) = 1. Computing d as145
the modular multiplicative inverse of e( mod ϕ(N)).
• Key distribution: Alice sends her public key (n, e) to Bob by a reliable,
but not necessarily secret channel. But Alice always keeps her private key
d secret.
• Encryption: Bob encrypts m by using Alice’s public key e: c = me150
mod N
• Decryption: Alice decrypts c by using her private key d : cd = me∗d
mod N ,since e ∗ d ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N).
Although attacks may know the Alice’s public key(e,N), but there is a negligible
probability to get the p and q because of large integer factorization is a NP -hard155
problem.
Definition 1. Let g1 be a generator of group G1, and let g2 be a generator
of group G2. G1 and G2 are multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q with
a additional Group GT . In this paper, we set G1 = G2, but in general cases
G1 6= G2. ψ is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1, with ψ(g2) = g1 . e is160
a bilinear map which is computable e : G1×G2 → GT with following properties
for points:
1. Bilinear: For any M ∈ G1, N ∈ G2, u, v ∈ Z, we have e(uM, vN ) =
e(M,N )uv.
2. Non-degenerate: e(g1, g2) 6= 1.165
3. commutative: For any M,N ∈ G2 , e(ψ(M),N ) = e(ψ(N ),M).
4. For any M1,M2 ∈ G1 and N ∈ G2, we have [42]
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e(M1M2,N ) = e(M1,N ) · e(M2,N )
3.2. Group Blind Signature
Group blind signature was firstly proposed by Lysyanskaya and Ramzan in
1998 FC conference [43], which adds the blind feature on the basis of group170
signature. Upon the signer finding signature, he only can ensure that the sig-
nature is signed by himself. The signer can neither confirm when he signed
the signature nor whom he signed the signature for. The scheme usually has
these entities including group manager, group member and external users and
consists of five steps:175
• Setup: Group manager firstly generates group public key y and group
private key x in an probability polynomial algorithm.
• Join: Group manager interacts with the new group member to generate
the new group member’s secret/public key pair and certificate.
• Sign: An probability polynomial algorithm that input message m and180
private key of the signer, then output the signature σ.
• Verify: Input (m,σ, y), a probability polynomial algorithm judges the
correctness of the signature.
• Open: A probability polynomial algorithm that output identify of the
signer by inputting the signature σ and group manger’s private key.185
3.3. Schnorr identification protocol
Schnorr identification protocol was proposed by Claus Schnorr in [44] and its
security is based on the discrete logarithm problem. We assume that Prover(P )
interactive with Verifier(V ) in three-rounds protocol to prove that he owns w
such that W = g−w mod q. The flowchart of Schnorr identification is following:190
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• First round: P randomly chooses number r ∈ Z∗q and calculates
R = gr mod q then sends R to V.
Prover
R=gr mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verifier
• Second round: V randomly picks e ∈ [0, 2t − 1], security of the
protocol is based on the parameter t, which means the protocol will
be more safer with the increase of t, and send e to P .
Verifier
e−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Prover
• Third round: P calculates S = (r + w · e) mod p and sends it to V .
Prover
S=(r+w·e) mod p−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verifier
V will verify whether the equation R = gs ·W e mod q is set up and
accept that P knows w only if the equation holds.
4. System Model and Adversary Model
4.1. System Model
The system model of our scheme is demonstrated in the Fig. 2, which involves
three entities’ working relationship. Control center(CC), which is responsible
for generating the system parameters, entity registration, data verification and195
tracing other entities conditional. Smart substation(SS), which can interactive
with the user directly, verify the identity of user and generate blind signature.
Smart meter(SM), which can record data in real time and send a whole period of
consumption data regularly, so there is a threat that the data being tampered.
In practice, the storage overhead and computing overhead of SM should be200
taken into consideration, because it’s a resource-constrained device.
Moreover, the structure of our scheme is based on the group blind signature.
When it comes to communication between three entities, they exchange message
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Figure 2: System model
in the tree topology structure which data flow bi-directional propagation in the
upper and lower levels. In our scheme, adversary can not only eavesdrop the205
channel between user and SS, but also attempt to tamper the data and disrupt
stability of system. In addition, since the property of traceability in our scheme,
CC can acquire the identity of signer or revoke the anonymity of user if failure
in signature verification or message verification, respectively.
4.2. Adversary Model210
The adversary model determines the capabilities and possible actions of the
attacker, adversary model is defined as follows:
1. Adversary can eavesdrop the channel between user and SS to obtain
users’ consumption information. In addition, spitefully forging and substituting
the original or intermediate value can destroy the stability and dependability of215
system that might result in the threaten to data integrity.
2.Users have two types, one is honest but curious which they want to get
other users’ consumption information but don’t want to change any data. The
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other one is trying to tamper with own consumption data.
3. CC is fully trusted and SS is semi-trusted which as long as SS correctly220
signs the signature, SS cannot trace to specific users.
5. OUR SCHEME
The scheme we proposed consists of five phases: 1. system initialization,
2. user anonymous authentication and data reporting, 3. message signing, 4.
verifying correctness of signature and integrity of data, 5. trace the singer or225
users. The framework is as shown in Fig. 3. In reality, the number of SS is much
less than the number of SM/User. So we plan to use SMi/Ui to distinguish the
different user and use the Si to indicate the number of SS. At last, we assume
that the number of SM is constant N , so i<N . In the phase of data reporting,
for simplicity, we only simulate the process of one user generating the tags.230
5.1. System Initialization
1) System parameter generation and releasing: The Fig. 4 shows the process
of generating the parameter.
• Step 1: CC chooses two big distinct prime p and q which satisfying p|q−1
and computes n = pq.235
• Step 2: CC calculates the RSA public key pair (e, d) which satisfies ed ≡ 1(
mod φ(n)), where φ(n) is Euler function. The group public key and group
private key are e and d respectively.
• Step 3: CC chooses a cyclic group G < g > which is subgroup of Z∗q .
While, CC randomly chooses the element x and calculates y = gx mod n.240
Hence, group manager’s public key and private key are y and x respec-
tively.
• Step 4: CC publicly chooses secure anti-collision hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}k.
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Figure 3: The framework of our scheme
• Step 5: CC releases the public parameter P = {n, e,G, g, y,H}.245
2)The phase of registering: The registering process is shown in Fig. 4.
• Step 1: If new group member (SS) wants to join the group, SS randomly
chooses the number xi ∈ Z∗q and sends it to the group manger (CC). CC
randomly chooses yi ∈ Z∗q and calculates C = yyixi mod n and C1 =
gyi mod n. Group manger returns PK = (C,C1) and group member ’s250
certificate xi to SS.
• Step 2: Useri opens an account in CC and gets infori = (IDi||address||timestack),
Useri will save the public value gi = (H(infori)x) mod n. CC installs
smart meter at user’s home. SMi saves gi and randomly chooses zi to
calculate Ii = g
zi mod n as his own id information and sends Ii to CC.255
5.2. User anonymous authentication and data reporting
1)user anonymous authentication: Each SM tries to convince SS that he
is valid user by using schnorr identification protocol and then transform the
encrypted message to SS. The detailed process is shown in the Fig. 5 .
12
• Step 1: SMi random chooses ti ∈ Z∗q and calculates T = gti mod n and260
sends to SS.
• Step 2: SS calculates cb = H(T ||timestack) and sends cb to user.
• Step 3: User calculates Si = ti − cbzi and sends Si to SS.
• Step 4: SS verifies the cb = H(gSiIcbi ||timestack).
Figure 4: System Initialization
Figure 5: The implement of our scheme
2)data reporting: SS verifies correctness of the meter and receives user’s en-265
crypted data. For simplicity, we only simulate one userk to encrypt information
data and report data. userk encrypts its consumption data and generates tags
for every data block. Since every data block mi is l dimensions, so we generate
one data tag ti for each data block mi. Then CC acquires all tags with the whole
day’s electric consumption data T ||m and verifies these tags whether match to270
the corresponding data block. The reporting process is shown in Fig. 5.
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• Step 1: Due to the security reason, the consumption data components
should be restricted by security parameter λ. For example, if security
parameter λ is set to 24, SM should generate twenty-four data blocks in a
day. So the electric consumption data we collected is in one hour. While,275
the consumption data is m = (cons, timestamp), in which cons represents
l-dimensional user’s electricity consumption data {L1, L2, L3 . . . .Ll}.
• Step 2: SM generates another random number stk ∈ Z∗q as the secret
tag key. Then SM outputs the public tag key ptk = gstkSMk mod n by
inputting the security parameter λ .280
• Step 3: SMk will generate l random values {x1, x2, x3 . . . .xl} and calcu-
late uj = g
xj
SMk
mod n for j ∈ [1, l]. For each data block mi, it computes
a data tag ti .SMk will generate tag for every data block(24/λ/day) by
calculating the ti =
(
H(MID||i) ·
∏l
j=1 u
mij
j
)stk
, in which MID is the
abstract of data and i is the block number of mi and it outputs the set of285
data tags T = {t1, t2, t3 . . . .ti} , i ∈ [1, 24/λ].
• Step 4: SM encrypts (m||T ) by using public key e. By doing so, we ensure
that no other entity can learn the consumption information, other than
group private key owner CC. Then SMk calculates M = (m||T )e and
H(m).290
• Step 5: SMk chooses an blind factor b to multiply H(m) and calculates
H(m)′ = bH(m) and β = gb mod n. Then SMk sends the pair(H(m)′, β)
to signer.
5.3. Blindly signature on the message
1)generate the signature :The process is shown in the Fig. 5.295
• Step 1: Signer randomly chooses a big prime k ∈ Z∗q and calculates k−1
which is the multiplicative inverse of k. Then computing the signature
σ∗ = (r, s∗, C, C1),where s∗ = k−1(H(m)′ − ryi) mod n, r = βk mod n ,
C1 = g
yi , C = yyixi.
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• Step 2: SMk removes the blind factor b by using s = s∗b−1 = b−1k−1(H(m)′−300
ryi) mod n, then gets the signature σ = (r, s, C,C1) and sends σ to CC.
5.4. Verification and traceability
1)verify the signature’s correctness and the data’s integrity: The detailed
process is shown in the Fig. 5.
• Step 1: CC decrypts M by using group private key d and gets the con-305
sumption information (m||T ) and computes H(m) .
• Step 2: CC verifies the correctness of signature by judging whether or not
the equation (1) is established. If the signature is verified correctly, it is
proved that m is not tampered with during transmission.
βH(m) = Cr1r
s (1)
• Step 3: if signature is legal ,we verify the M by using the Tag T to test
whether data has been modified. CC acquires T , m and ui by decrypted
M . Hence, CC can compute following values:
TG = Π
24/λ
i=1 ti (2)
MGj =
24/λ∑
i=1
mij (3)
DG = Πlj=1e(uj , ptk)
MGj (4)
H = Π
24/λ
i=1 h(MID||i) (5)
• Step 4: Then CC verifies whether equation(6) is set up:310
DG · e(H, ptk) = e(TG, gSMk) (6)
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• Step 5: If equation(6) is setting up, we can sure that the consumer’s
information has not been modified. If not, CC will revoke the anonymity
of user to check whether user or external adversary have changed the
consumer’s information.
2)trace the identify of signer and revoke the anonymity of user: The detailed315
process is shown in the Fig. 5.
• Step 1: If we find that there is controversy when verifying the signature
equation, CC can open the signature to verify signer’s identity xi and find
the information of SS by using the CC’s private key.
xi = C/C
x
1
= yyixi/g
yix
• Step 2: If equation (6) isn’t established, we find that the integrity of m
has been destoryed, the anonymity of user will be revoked by CC to check
whether adversary or user have changed data. Due to different SM has
different gSM , when CC acquires m||T and corresponding gSM .
gSMi = H(infori)x mod n
= H(IDi||address||timestack)x mod n
CC calculates gSMi by using infori in the database and compares to the320
original gSM , which can insure the identify of user.
6. Security Analysis
Due to our system model has been improved on the basis of Jan Camenisch
and Markus Stadler’s group blind signature, obviously our scheme is as secure
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as their’s. The security of our scheme is based on the several difficulty prob-325
lems assumption, which including discrete logarithm problem, integer factoriza-
tion problem, and Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) problem. In addition,
our scheme is based on the security of Schnorr’s identification protocol and
RSA encryption. In this section, we prove that our scheme has authenticatabil-
ity, privacy-preserving, traceability, unforgeability and anonymity. The specific330
analysis is following:
6.1. Authenticatability
Authenticatability means that only legal users can upload their consumption
information to SS. In our data reporting protocol, SS will verify the validity of
consumers’ identity. Only verifying successfully, SS can give a blind signature335
to data and send encrypted data with signature to CC. In the authenticated
process, we use schnorr identification protocol to authenticate the user’s identity.
Theorem 1. The Schnorr identification protocol is an interactive protocol that
has two parties, prover A and honest-verifier B. If A and B run the protocol
successfully, B is always convinced A′s identity.340
Proof.
cb = H(T ||timestack)
= H(gti ||timestack)
= H(gSi+cbzi ||timestack)
?
= H(gSiIcbi ||timestack)
SS can calculate gSiIcbi and compare it with T . Hence, as long as SS and SM
can follow the protocol, SS will accept SM ’s proof of identity.
Theorem 2. The Schnorr identification protocol based on discrete-log related
assumption is secure against impersonation under concurrent attack [44].
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Proof. Proof sketch: As the security proof show in the [45], the main idea is to345
use a “rewinding technique”:
1. Suppose there is probabilistic adversary A who interactive with V , so that
the probability of V acceptance is ε. Assuming that discrete logarithm can
be computed in a constant and positive odds by adversary A.
2. A as a prover interacts with an honest verifier V twice. The V chooses350
different random value cb1 and cb2 , then A calculate S1 = t − cb1z and
S2 = t− cb2z. A wins if both S1 and S2 accepted by V .
3. Output z = (S1 − S2)/(cb2 − cb1) when cb2 6= cb1 . In the first time, the
probability of V successfully accepting is ε, while the probability that V
accepts in the second time is also the polynomial probability of ε. Due to355
the discrete logarithm problem over being hard, so the authentication is
security against the impersonation attack.
6.2. Unforgeability
Unforgeability refer to the fact that external adversary can’t forge or tamper360
with the file. In our scheme of data reporting, the meter will set security param-
eter λ in advance to control the times of reporting. If the security parameter
is λ, the frequency of sending report is 24h/λ. At the same time, we introduce
the homomorphic tag mechanism to verify whether the original data has been
modified.365
Definition 2. The Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) problem is that, con-
sider a cyclic group G of order q, given G ∈ G and (G,Gx,Gy) for randomly
chosen unknown x and y . It’s infeasible to compute Gxy [46].
We define (ι− ε)− CDHconsumption as a ι-time algorithm A has an non-
negligible probability ε to resolve the CDH-problem.370
Pr[A(G,Gx,Gy) = Gxy] ≥ ε,
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The CDH assumption indicates that the probability of solving the CDH
problem in polynomial time algorithm is negligible, which means that this ad-
vantage ε is negligible.
Theorem 3. If our scheme has been correctly performed by all entities, the
equation will hold when the CC executes the verification.375
Proof. The correctness of our verification equation (6) is elaborated as follows:
DG · e(H, ptk) =Πlj=1e(uj , ptk)MGj · e(H, ptk)
e(TG, gSMk) =e(Π
24/λ
i=1 ti, gSMk)
=e
((
Π
24/λ
i=1
(
H(MID||i) ·
l∏
j=1
u
mij
j
)stk
, gSMk
)
=e
(
Π
24/λ
i=1
(
H(MID||i)stk, gSMk
)
· e
( l∏
j=1
Π
24/λ
i=1 u
mijstk
j , gSMk
)
=e(H, gstkSMk) · e
( l∏
j=1
u
∑24/λ
i=1 mij
j , g
stk
SMk
)
=e(H, gstkSMk) · e
( l∏
j=1
uj , g
stk
SMk
)∑24/λ
i=1 mij
⇒ Πlj=1e(uj , ptk)MGj = e
( l∏
j=1
u
∑24/λ
i=1 mij
j , g
stk
SMk
)
= Πlj=1e
(
u
∑24/λ
i=1 mij
j , g
stk
SMk
)
= Πlj=1e
(
uj , g
stk
SMk
)∑24/λ
i=1 mij
Hence , we ensure that the equation DG · e(H, ptk) = e(TG, gSMk) will
establish through the formula if all participants follow as our scheme.
Theorem 4. The verification tag is unforgeable for the possibility of any ad-
versary A win the verification game is negligible ε in the polynomial time.
Proof. We assume that adversary A can forge the tag and construct a challenger380
C. When A queries C, C will respond A correctly. The game is illustrated below.
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• Setup: Define set B = {m1,m2, . . . ,m24/λ} is the challenged block mes-
sage. Challenger C performs Setup algorithm to generate system parame-
ter to adversary A, which includes P = {n, e,G, g, y, h}. Then C randomly
choose x ∈ Z∗q .385
• Hash queries: A sends the message’s ID mi to the challenger C. Only if
mi exists in set B, C can return the corresponding value h(MID||i)stk to
A .
• Extract queries: A queries the block’s private key by sending the ID of
block message mi. If mi is in the set B, C randomly chooses xj ∈ Z∗q and390
calculates uj = g
xj
SMk
.
• KeyGen queries: A queries meter’s secret tag key by sending sequence of
smart meter k. C returns ptk = gstk to A if the SM exist.
• Tag queries: A sends the data block mi to query the verification tag
from C. C calculates tag as following395
ti = H(MID||i)stk ·
l∏
j=1
u
mijstk
j
and returns to A.
• Outputs: A finally outputs ti∗ at data block mi∗ with the abstract of mi∗
MID∗. We can obtain following equation:
ti∗ =
(
H(MID∗||i∗)
)stk · l∏
j=1
u
mi∗jstk
j
= (H(MID∗||i∗))stk ·
l∏
j=1
g
xjmi∗jstk
SMk
It is easy to see the conclusions described in the following from this equa-
20
tion.
l∏
j=1
gxjstk =
(
H(MID∗||i∗)−skt
)1/mi∗j
(7)
We can draw a conclusion that A solves the CDH − assumption in the
polynomial time algorithm with the non-negligible possibility, which con-400
tradicts with the hardness of CDH − assumption. Hence, the adversary
can’t forge the valid tag.
6.3. Privacy-Preserving
Theorem 5. Adversary cannot get the user’s consumption information in the405
initial and intermediate phrase.
Proof. In two phrases of data reporting and blind signature, adversary and SS
have ability to get the encrypted user’s consumption information M and can’t
get private key of CC directly. So the possible way is to divide the big prime
number into p and q. We assume that factorizing N into correct p and q is an410
non-negligible possibility ε in the polynomial time algorithm. However, there is
no efficient algorithm to resolve the problem of prime factorization. Hence, our
scheme can efficiently protect the privacy of users’ consumption information.
6.4. Anonymity415
The scheme is anonymity if m is leaked, but the Adversary cannot get the
identity of the information owner.
Theorem 6. Even if the adversary can crawl into the private database of CC
and steal the decrypted information m and T, A can’t infer the identity of the
user by analysing the consumption information m.420
Proof. If Adversary tries to infer the identify of data owner, the only way is to
get gSMk from ti =
(
H(MID||i) ·
∏l
j=1 g
xj ·mij
SMi
)stk
and compare to H(infori)x
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mod n. However, Adversary has no capacity for getting gSMk because of solving
the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
For experiment Exp(b) is for giving gSM ,the adversary choose the correct425
corresponding infrobi from infrob0 and infrob1 for i = 0, 1.
Algorithm 1 Experiment ExpAnon−bGBS,A (b)
- Exp(b)← Afind(gSM )
- (infrobo , infrob1)← Exp(b)
- bi ← Aguess(gSM , infrobo , infrob1)
- return bi
More formally, we define that all PPT adversaries A have a negligible ad-
vantage AdvAnon−bGBS,A , where the advantage is defined as follows:
AdvAnonGBS,A = Pr|ExpAnon−0GBS,A (b0) = 1− Exp
Anon−1
GBS,A (b1) = 1|
= ε
Hence, we can draw a conclusion that the true probability of identifying the
correct user identity from the set {infroi} is 1/N + ε after the adversary steals
the user’s information. We define the probaility as following:
AdvIdenGBS,A = Pr|Exp
Iden−infori
GBS,A (binfori) = 1|
= 1/N + ε
,when the number of user N approaches a large integer, 1/N +ε will converge to430
a negligible probability. It is clear that such a game captures the requirement
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that adversary can’t link the m to identify of the user, so anonymity can be
guaranteed.
6.5. Traceability
Theorem 7. If the equation (1) is not established, the CC executes tracking435
operation to get the signer’s information by using xi = C/C
x
1 . Next, CC will
revoke the anonymity of user, if the equation (6) isn’t established.
Proof. Correctness:
βH(m)
?
= Cr1r
s
= gyir · βks
= gyir · gbks
= gyir+bkb
−1k−1(H(m)′−ryi)
= gH(m)
′
By verifying the correctness of equation (1), CC can check the signature issuing
from SS.
xi = C/C
x
1
= yyixi/g
yix
= xi
CC can get identity of signer by using group private key x which only group
manager owns.
gSMi = H(infori)x mod n
= H(IDi||address||timestack)x mod n
Finally, by utilizing registration information in the database, CC can calculate
H(infori)x one by one to match the result with corresponding gSMi .
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Table 1: Features Comparison
Schemes Ours [18] [47] [48]
Fine-grained Data
√ √ √ √
Anonymous Authentication
√ √ √ √
Unforgeability
√
×
√ √
Data Integrity
√
× ×
√
Traceability
√
× × ×
Scalability
√
×
√
×
†
√
: Support the feature
† ×: Dot not support the feature
7. Performance Analysis and Evaluation440
In the section, the proposed scheme is analysed in the aspects of features,
computational cost and performance evaluation. From results of analysis and
comparison, our scheme not only has more functionality and features, but also
can be more practical in reality.
7.1. Features Comparison445
In this subsection, our scheme is compared with Dimitriou [18] and Zargar [47]
in terms of fine-gained data, anonymous authentication, unforgeability, data in-
tegrity, traceability and scalability. As shown in Table 1, [18] can get the
fine-grained usage data and achieve anonymous authentication, but it cannot
sure that the file is modified by the external adversary. In addition, both [18]450
and [47] cannot achieve data integrity in the transmission process and trace
malicious participants when signature or data are corrupted. Finally, although
[48] can efficiently protect the privacy of consumer, it cannot trace malicious
participants and use widely.
7.2. Computational cost455
In the subsection, we can divide it into three stages including System setup,
anonymous authentication, blind signature generating and verification. Note
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that we count modular multiplication operation M , modular exponentiation
operation E, Weil Pairing operation W and hash operation H for every phase.
In addition, these operations are positively related to the participants, hence,460
we assume that the number of SM is v and the number of SS is s. Compu-
tational cost comparison is demonstrated in Table 2 in terms of setup phase,
authentication phase, sigGen phase and proof phase.
In the setup phase, CC needs to calculate y, C, C1, gi, Ii and a hash
h(infori). Hence, M = s, E = s + 2v + 1, H = v. Then the identify of SM465
will be authenticated by SS in the second phase, T = gti will be obtained by
SM to compute v times of exponentiation operation. While, for providing au-
thentication service, SS will compute 2v times of exponentiation operation gsi
and Icb , 2v times of modular multiplication operation and v times of modular
multiplication operation. In the third phase, H(m), (m||T )e and β will be cal-470
culated by using 2v modular exponentiation and v hash function. To verify the
correctness of the equation(1), CC will compute Cr1r
s, βh(m) by using 4v modu-
lar exponentiation and v modular multiplication. In summary, M = v, E = 6v,
H = v. The experimental comparison results are shown in Fig. 6(a),6(b), time
cost increases linearly with the number of users and substations, but increases475
more slowly than [47, 31, 48].
Specially, in the report generating phase homomorphic tag mechanism has
been firstly used in smart grid to verify the integrity of data. Before reporting
consumption message, ptk, uj , and ti should be computed by SMk with 1 +
l + 24/λ(l+1) modular exponentiation, 24/λ modular multiplication and 24/λ480
hash in a day. When CC decrypts messages m, l Weil pairing operations and
24/λ Hash operations are needed for computing DG and H. At the same time,
e(H, ptk) and e(TG, gSMk) are 2 Weil pairing operations. Hence, we totally
need M= 24/λ, E = 1 + l + 24/λ(l + 1), H= 24/λ, W = l + 2 in the report
generating and verifying phase in a day for one user and CC.485
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Table 2: Computational cost comparison
Protocol Setup Authentication SigGen Proof
Ours s(M + E)+v(2E)+vH v(M + 2E) v(E +H) v(6E + M +
H)
[47] sW + v(3M + 2E +H) v(3E +W ) v(2E +M) v(5E+5M+
2W )
[31] v(4M + 4E) v(3E + 5M) v(6E + 4M) v(5E + 5M)
[48] v(M + 4W ) v(2W + 3M) 3vM 10vM
† M,E,W,H: Operations of modular multiplication operation, modular exponentiation,
Weil Pairing and hash
† ×: v, s: The number of SM and SS
(a) Computational comparison under constant substations
(b) Computational comparison under constant users
Figure 6: The computational cost comparison
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7.3. Performance Evaluation
To simulate the efficient our scheme in reality, we perform on a desktop
installed Ubuntu16.04 with Intel Core i3-3120 CPU and 4GB memory. The
simulation experiment is carried out by C language, in which pairing-based
cryptography(PBC) library and GUN multiply precision arithmetic(GMP) li-490
brary are used. The experimental results are obtained from the terminal of the
Linux and calculated the average value of twenty times. At the same time, we
acquire the graph by using MATLAB 2017a.
The simulation is made up by four stage. In the first stage, setup time
overhead is presented by increasing of the number of smart meters and smart495
substations. It is clearly that time cost is linear with the two variables. When
the number of smart meters is up to 1000 and the number of smart substation is
up to 10, the time cost is 13.005s in Fig. 7(a). In Fig. 7(b), the simulation result
shows that the time cost will increase with the smart meters and decrease with
the number of smart substations. As shown in the Fig. 7(b), the time overhead500
is 0.202s when the number of SM and SS up to 1000 and 10, respectively. The
reason is that, load balance technology [49] will assign different SM authentica-
tion services to different SS to increase data processing capability. Ideally, with
the increase of SM and SS, time consumption will be stable within a certain
range. Just as shown in Fig. 7(c), the time consumption of blind signature also505
satisfies this rule. The time cost will decline rapidly with the increase of SS.
Specially in Fig. 7(d),we present the time consumption on the tag genera-
tion phase and tag verification phase. From the experimental result, it’s clear
that time consumption is positively related to the number of data blocks and
the dimensions of data. When the number of data dimension and data block510
are both up to 1000, the time cost of tag generation and tag verification are
0.071835s and 0.000009s respectively.
Through all above experiments, our scheme has proofed efficient and per-
formed well when facing large-scale users. Hence, the scheme not only can be
proved secure, but also has a good scalability.515
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(a) Setup time
(b) Time of anonymous authentication
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(c) Time of blind signature
(d) Time of tag generation and verification
Figure 7: Efficiency simulation for different phases.
29
8. Conclusion
In the paper, we have proposed a practical group blind signature scheme
with anonymous authentication and privacy-preservation for smart grid. Four
phases are included into the proposed scheme: the phase-I, where, SMs, SSs
finish registration after CC generates system parameters. In phase-II, SMs520
anonymously authenticate with SS by employing the schnorr identification.
Subsequently, the homomorphic tags are generated by SMs for verifying the
integrity of data. Phase-III, where SS generates group blind signature for data
from authenticated SM . In Phase-IV, the correctness of signature and the
integrity of data are verified by CC. The experiment simulation shows that525
our scheme is scalable and efficient. In our future work, we plan to expand
our scheme to accomplish the anonymous rewarding when consumer’s power
consumption meets certain standards by using block chain.
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